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The Ambiguous Moral Foundations
of the Underground Economy
George L. Priest
Most treatments of the underground economy presuppose that underground
economies cannot be morally justified. This moral condemnation is suggested
by the conventional taxonomy of activities comprising the underground
economy itself: illegal, unreported, unrecorded, and informal. A recent U.S.
Department of Labor publication, for example, defines the illegal sector of the
underground economy as "economic activities pursued in violation of legal
statutes defining the scope of legitimate forms of commerce," presenting
examples such as prostitution or the trade in drugs. The same publication
defines the "unreported economy" as comprising "those economic activities
that circumvent or evade ... the tax code"; "the unrecorded economy" as
those "that circumvent the institutional rules that define the reporting
requirements of government statistical agencies"; and "the informal economy"
as "those economic activities that circumvent the costs of... the laws and
administrative rules covering property relationships, commercial licensing," or
other governmental regulations.
These various activities are obviously similar in their circumvention of
rules or regulations, but they are similar in a deeper sense because their
existence is presumed to directly impede legitimate government actions, as
well as broader values of the citizenry. For example, in a recent essay,
Professor Feige, the most prominent scholar of the underground economy,
explains the "conceptual linkage among underground economies" as
comprising two elements: concealment and immorality. The intentional
concealment of this set of economic activities from government and
policymakers biases and distorts economic data-data which the government
relies upon to control the economy.
t John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Leon Lipson,
to Franco Romani, to my colleague Owen M. Fiss, and to participants at the Law and Economics
Workshop, University of Toronto for comments on earlier drafts, and to the students and participants in
a seminar that Professor Fiss and I have offered over several years for many helpful ideas.
I. GREGORY K. SCHOEPFLE Er AL., SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SOCIAL DE MEXICO &
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 4 (1992) [hereinafter
DEP'T OF LABOR].
2259
The Yale Law Journal
To the extent that national accounting systems are based on data
sources primarily collected from the formal sector, a large and
growing informal economy will play havoc with perceptions of
development based on official statistics, and consequently with policy
decisions based exclusively on information provided by official
sources.
2
In addition, and more importantly, the underground economy represents a
moral challenge to the most basic legal and political institutions of a society.
Thus, according to Professor Feige, the "most serious consequence" of illegal
activities "is to undermine the stability and responsibility of political, legal and
economic institutions that might otherwise serve to facilitate the [economic]
development process."3 He condemns the unreported economy on similar
moral grounds: "Tax noncompliance shifts the burden from the dishonest to the
honest, increasing the costs of adherence to any system of rules and
regulations."4 And finally, Professor Feige regards the impact of informal
economic activities as even more harmful: "An often overlooked consequence
of growing informality is the unraveling of the social and political fabric." 5
Most other treatments in the academic literature share this moral perspective.
6
This Essay critically examines such moral judgments. It is inspired by two
developments of recent times. First, the collapse of the socialist economies of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggests that we must reevaluate our
presumptions about the comparative virtue of economic organization by the
state versus organization by the market. The debate during the 1930's and
1940's between Lerner and Lange, who demonstrated the theoretical possibility
of optimizing societal resources through government planning, and the
Austrians, who maintained that only the market could achieve this result, was
never closed. Given the subsequent appearance after World War II of a
sustained and surviving rivalry between Eastern and Western economies,
students of political economy have been required at least to entertain the
proposition that government planning might be more successful than a
competitive marketplace in attaining such widely held societal goals as the
efficient allocation of resources and the equitable distribution of income. The
recent abject failure of Eastern-controlled economies in terms of both
efficiency and growth (and of even more basic humanistic, environmental, and
2. Edgar L. Feige, Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New
Institutional Economics Approach, 18 WORLD DEV. 989, 993 (1990).
3. Id. at 991.
4. Id. at 993.
5. Id. Note, however, that in other writings Professor Feige acknowledges some benefits of
underground economic activities, though he views these benefits as clearly outweighed by the activities'
social harm. Edgar L. Feige, Introduction to THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES 1, 9 (Edgar L. Feige ed.,
1989).
6. See generally FRANK A. COIL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT (1990); CARL P. SIMON & ANON D.
WADI, BEATING THE SYSTEM (1982); DAViD J. PYLE, TAX EVASION AND THE BLACK ECONOMY (1989).
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democratic objectives) compels a reconsideration of that position. In an age in
which all of the world's great socialist economies have fallen and are moving
toward capitalism (however falteringly), it is less clear than before whether the
broader public interest is better served by that form of planning that the
underground economies evade or by the productive activities of the
underground economies themselves.
Second, modem studies of Eastern economies have been supplemented by
similar evidence from the Third World and developing economies suggesting
that capitalistic energies have succeeded in aiding the poor to a greater extent
than have the most ardent efforts of socialist politics. This evidence, too,
compels a reevaluation of the role of underground economies in otherwise
broadly capitalistic societies.
Although this Essay describes some of the social and political
contributions of underground economic activity, it does not claim that all
features of underground economies are socially beneficial or congruent with
democratic values. The goal of the Essay is more modest: to reorient the
dialogue-especially the moral dialogue-concerning underground economies.
By necessity, it must also address the broader moral defensibility of capitalism
itself.
Part I begins the discussion by presenting illustrations taken from studies
of the underground economy in a pre-1989 socialist state and, separately, in
a modem developing nation. These examples show how underground economic
activities-however violative of established legal norms-represent private
efforts to achieve ends widely valued in most societies, such as increasing the
wealth of a country and aiding its poor. Part II generalizes this proposition by
comparing the relative moral positions of market-based and state-controlled
regulatory activities. Over the past century, most defenders of the market have
emphasized values such as personal liberty and wealth creation, which most
agree are important,7 but which many are willing to sacrifice toward the
achievement of broader societal goals. Part I1 defends the market-and,
through that defense, underground economic activity-on additional grounds.
This defense shows through the example of the underground economy how the
market achieves many democratic values often asserted as justifications for
broader governmental regulation. Part III extends the analysis to underground
economic activity in the United States. Again, it cannot be claimed that all
underground activities are morally justifiable and, no doubt, many will dispute
the morality of particular types of underground activities, but the Essay will
attempt to show that the broader condemnation of underground economies,
however conventional, is highly problematic and cannot be defended.
7. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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I. Two EXAMPLES OF UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES AT WORK
This Part describes the operation of underground economies in a centrally
planned socialist state, the former Soviet Union, and in a Third World
developing nation, Peru. The descriptions are not exhaustive and are meant
only to illustrate major forms of underground economic activity. Examples
were chosen from these countries because, given the nature of their respective
governments, Western readers are less likely to condemn automatically the
widespread contravention of the law that these underground activities display.8
Section A reviews the underground economy of the former Soviet Union, and
Section B reviews that of Peru. Section C discusses similarities across these
two very different economic cultures.
A. The Underground Economy in a Centrally Planned State
Prior to its fall in 1991, the Soviet Union (and, to a greater or lesser
extent, its satellite countries) possessed a formal economy in which the state
owned and controlled the means of production; made all resource allocation
decisions; and prohibited a wide range of private economic activities, including
the ownership of property and, in particular, private speculation.
Notwithstanding these prohibitions, it was widely acknowledged that a
substantial underground economy provided a broad range of goods and services
to the Soviet citizenry.
1. Agriculture
The formal agricultural economy in the Soviet Union consisted of state
farms and collective farms whose production decisions were largely subject to
central control. State and collective farms were allocated all resources
necessary for production, including land, machinery, seeds, fertilizer, and the
like. In addition to this formal production, however, there existed a second
agricultural economy, based upon private production entirely from small plots
of land-adjoining or near to individual houses-that the state allocated to
collective farm workers for their own production. These private plots were
each quite small (on average, three-fourths of an acre),9 and they were fanned
with the crudest of implements.1" In 1985, these private plots constituted only
8. A review and evaluation of the underground economy in a Western capitalist country (the United
States) are presented infra, Part III.
9. ZHORES A. MEDVEDEV, SoviEr AGRICULTURE 363 (1987).
10. Id. at 364-65.
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1.4% of arable land in the Soviet Union,1 yet they accounted for
extraordinary proportions of total Soviet agricultural production: 60% of
potatoes; 29% of vegetables; 28% of meat; 29% of milk; 28% of eggs; and
26% percent of wool.1 2 Private production was virtually the only source for
carrots, onions, garlic and other spices, tomatoes, beets, soft fruits, honey, and
flowers. 3 Private production supplied more than one-half of all food
consumed by the rural population, and 90% of high quality food. 4
Private farming, of course, had been suppressed under Stalin, although
authorities tolerated garden plots seemingly directed to self-consumption.15
The substantial second market developed because of shortages in production
from state and collective farms. 16 Indeed, when Brezhnev and Kosygin
learned in the early 1960's of the disproportionate production generated by
private plots, they relaxed the prohibitions on private farming. 17 Over the
years since, the state increasingly encouraged self-production of food.
Gardening commissions have been organized to help citizens obtain farm
implements, seeds, and fertilizer for private fanning. '8 The state also
promoted private farming by industrial enterprises and even by the army. 9
The state began to supply rural growers with transportation facilities to bring
their excess produce to urban markets. Markets themselves, previously
suppressed because they might enable speculation, were fostered, and their
number increased rapidly.20 Finally, the state devised a theory that regarded
private production as integral to "developed socialism." 2' Subsidiary private
agriculture was extolled as for its important role in the education of children
as workers, instilling diligence, and influencing the development of values that
consolidated the rural population.'
11. Il at 364 tbl. 45.
12. Id. at 366 tbl. 46. Similar data for 1979 are presented in FJ.M. Feldbrugge, The Soviet Second
Economy in a Political and Legal Perspective, in THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES, supra note 5, at 311.
13. MEDVEDEV, supra note 9, at 366.
14. Id. at 365. There are similar reports in other Eastern European countries. In Hungary, for example,
Gabor reports that the second economy produced an agricultural production value 10% greater than the
formal economy. Istvan R. Gabor, Second Economy and Socialism: The Hungarian Experience, in THE
UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES, supra note 5, at 339, 353.
15. MEDVEDEV, supra note 9, at 362-63.
16. Id. at 361.
17. Id.
18. Boris Rumer, The "Second" Agriculture in the USSR, 33 SOVIET STuD. 560, 564 (1981). It was
also a common practice for workers on collective farms to carry off such supplies. Feldbrugge, supra note
12, at 313.
19. Rumer, supra note 18, at 563, 566-68.
20. Id. at 565.
21. Id. at 563.
22. V. Nefedov, Razvitiye Podsobnykh Khozyaistv, 11 VOPROsY ECONOMIm 56, quoted in MEDVEDEV,
supra note 9, at 367.
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2. Housing and Home Repair
There was no official private ownership of homes in the Soviet Union, 3
but it was estimated that one-half of the Soviet population and one-fourth of
the Soviet urban population lived in privately constructed and owned
housing.24 In 1975, nonstate construction entities completed thirty percent of
all new housing space, often with materials acquired on the black market. 1
The rental of housing was formally prohibited as a form of speculation but was
quite common, especially in holiday resorts and cities.
26
Construction work itself was a state enterprise, but increasingly common
were groups of private tradespeople who travelled to places around the country
where labor was short, selling their services at private market prices.2 7 In one
province during the early 1980's, these private workers-called shabashniki
(sabbath workers, because they were willing to work on the
sabbath)--completed 50% more than state construction enterprises over the
same period. 28 Home repair was dominated even more heavily by the second
economy. Estimates of the market share of private home repair and decoration
reached 70% in Moscow and 99% in rural areas such as Georgia.29
3. Information and Cultural Products
Although the Soviet state controlled the publication of books and other
media, a substantial black market existed, particularly in Soviet-made, as
opposed to foreign-produced, books. This market arose because the state's
production plan provided for vastly insufficient numbers of books, especially
the classics, given the demands of the citizenry.30 This particular shortage
created a form of higher social status for speculation in classical works:
According to one participant, "The resale of blue jeans is considered ... rather
'drclassW'. Speculation in Herodotus-that is the mark of success."
3'
23. Rights of occupancy were recognized, however. Gregory Grossman, The "Second Economy" of
the USSR, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 25, 26.
24. Id. Gabor estimates for Hungary that one-half of the houses built each year and 80% of those in
villages are built privately. Gabor, supra note 14, at 354.
25. Grossman, supra note 23, at 26.
26. Dennis O'Hearn, The Consumer Second Economy: Size and Effects, 32 SoviEr STUD. 218, 225
(1980); Grossman, supra note 23, at 26.
27. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 25; Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 308.
28. Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 308.
29. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 225-26. Gabor estimates for Hungary that over 83% of home repair
services are provided privately. Gabor, supra note 14, at 355.
30. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 223.
31. Id. Comparisons of official prices to black market prices show Herodotus selling for three times
the official price; George Sand at eighteen times; Dumas at fifteen times; and many authors, European and
Russian, not available at all except on the black market. Id. at 224 tbl. 1.
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There are similar examples for other products. One observer reports that
private vendors of video recordings offered 10,000 titles; the state store, only
1000.32 In the early 1980's, a thriving private market for phonograph
recordings developed, supplied by a substantial underground record production
industry.33 From 1 to 2.5 million recordings were produced each year from
private recording studios. 34 As might be expected, the production of other
information products such as posters-especially political posters-was entirely
private.35
4. Other Products and Services
36
a. Hunting and Furs, Fishing
The hunting and fur trapping industries were dominated by private
production. Approximately 80% of muskrat yields (chiefly used for hats)
derived from private sources. 37 Because of the higher relative quality of the
privately harvested yield, it accounted for 94% of total muskrat fur
expenditures. 31 Sixty-one percent of expenditures on fish were to black
market sources.39
b. Medical Services
Medicines and the services of surgeons, physicians, nurses, and other
medical personnel (otherwise freely provided by the state) provided an active
black market because of pervasive shortages in state supplies.40 Ilegal
abortions, which necessarily involved private providers of medical services,
numbered four to eight million each year.41
32. HEDRICK SMITH, THE NEW RUSSIANS 266 (1990).
33. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 224.
34. l; see also Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 323.
35. Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 326 n.63.
36. Kornai reports that, in Hungary, the most common forms of underground activity are repair jobs
including auto, home, and appliance repair, and domestic services. Jdnos Kornai, Some Lessons from the
Hungarian Experiencefor Chinese Reformers, in MARKET REFORMS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETIES: COMPARING
CHINA AND HUNGARY 75, 91 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1989).
37. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 223.
38. Id. at 226-27.
39. Id. at 226.
40. Grossman, supra note 23, at 32 n.28.
41. NIKOLAI SHMELEV & VLADIMIR POPOV, THE TURNING POINT: REVITALIZING THE SOVIET
ECONOMY 198-99 (1989).
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c. Petroleum for Autos
Because the state subsidized gasoline at exceptionally low prices, there
were chronic shortages. Reports estimate that 80% of gasoline used in private
automobiles in Kazakhstan and almost 87% in Omsk came from black market
purchases.42 Virtually all of the black market supply was stolen from
governmental sources.43
d. Spare Parts
Most spare part supplies-for machinery as well as appliances-had to be
obtained on the black market." Indeed, specific shortages created unusual
markets. As an example, in many cities, markets flourished for jam jar lids.45
5. The Underground Economy and the State Bureaucracy
Although underground economic activities were formally prohibited by the
state, state officers were in fact often substantially involved in underground
activities. In some cases, this involvement served to further the nominal
objectives of the state. In other instances, the objectives appear to have been
purely personal to the state officer--corruption-although the distinction was
not always clear.
a. Diversion to Increase State Productivity
Enterprise managers often diverted supplies from intended uses and
bartered them to obtain other supplies necessary to meet enterprise production
goals or to improve employee morale.46 Here, either because of a shortage in
necessary supplies or their delay in arrival, managers evaded the strict
requirements of controllers in order to better achieve the goals the controllers
had set for them.
b. Allocation of Government-Provided Products
Although the prices of government products sold at state stores were
strictly controlled, it was apparently a widespread and well-established practice
42. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 221.
43. Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 303.
44. Id. at 322.
45. Id. at 325 n.60.
46. See Grossman, supra note 23, at 30.
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for employee vendors to set aside preferred products or those in greatest
shortage for specific patrons, who would reward the salesperson with a tip or
"gift." The tip was usually split between the salesperson and the next-higher
supervisor and then split again, repeatedly, up the salesforce hierarchy.47
The state bureaucracy took advantage of shortages in consumer goods in
a different way, by institutionalizing a form of government privilege to serve
as a bureaucratic incentive. Government workers could earn "certificate
rubles," rewards expressed in terms of rubles but exchangeable only in special
stores that sold very scarce consumer products at subsidized low prices.4
Prior to their abolition in 1975, certificate rubles sold on the black market at
six to eight times their face value.49
c. Bribes
Direct bribes in the form of money or goods were widely used to secure
such official forms of authorization as a driver's license, a permit to buy a car,
an allocation of living space, a residential building permit, and admittance to
an educational institution.50 Through bribery, people also obtained passing
grades on examinations and doctors' certificates that allowed them to stay
home from work.'
d. The Existence of the Black Market as a Recruitment Device
One of the great attractions of government service was that it provided
extensive opportunities to travel abroad. Beyond simple enjoyment, travel
enabled a government officer to buy domestically unavailable products, either
for personal consumption or for conversion on financially attractive terms on
the domestic black market.53 In addition, a government position would
generally insulate a citizen from prosecution for participation in illegal
economic activities 4 Alexander Yakovlev, a Gorbachev ally who had run the
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party during the 1970's, put the
matter more sharply: "[T]he 'shadow economy' in our country is not
47. Id.
48. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 228; Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 332.
49. O'Hearn, supra note 26, at 228.
50. Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 322.
51. Id. at 322 n.53.
52. Id. at 332.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 334.
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something that exists alongside the 'lawful economy.' It is the official
economy but is used by officials for their own interests."'55
B. The Informal Economy of a Developing Nation
Peru can be characterized formally as a capitalist, free market country, in
which governmental activities resemble those of typical Western welfare states.
According to descriptions in a recent book by Hernando de Soto, however,
Peru's legal system consists of a regulatory bureaucracy which exerts
substantial control on developing enterprise through a tightly administered
system of permits and authorizations. 6 De Soto sought to determine and
quantify the costs of initiating various forms of commercial enterprise in Peru.
He and his researchers found that full compliance with the laws and
regulations of Peru would require eighty-three months to obtain a permit to
build housing on state-owned waste land; ten months, at a cost equal to thirty-
two times the monthly minimum wage, to start a business; forty-three days to
open a retail store; seventeen years to open a market; and twenty-seven months
to gain an otherwise unused transport concession.57 These costs of proceeding
through official governmental channels are obviously substantial. According
to de Soto, they have given rise to a large informal economy operating
nominally outside the law.
1. Informal Housing
Between 1940 and 1981, the urban population of Peru increased from 2.4
to 11.6 million people. 8 The largest share of this increase resulted from mass
migration from the countryside to the cities.5 9 The existing urban housing
stock was insufficient to handle the migration, especially since the majority of
immigrants were very poor.
These conditions led to the spread of what de Soto calls "informal
housing., 60 Informal housing consists of settlements of dwellers who neither
own the land upon which they have built, nor obtain certifications of
compliance with existing building and sanitation codes. These settlements are
55. ALEXANDER YAKOVLEV, THE FATE OF MARXISM IN RUSSIA 112 (Catherine A. Fitzpatrick trans.,
1993) (alteration in original).
56. The Peruvian discussion here derives entirely from HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989).
57. Id. at 133-46. De Soto's group decided to pay bribes to officials to accelerate the process only if
absolutely required. Id. at 134. They were solicited frequently, but were obliged to pay bribes only twice
during the study. Id. at xiv.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id
60. Id. at 17-57.
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initiated by an organized "invasion" of unused land. Typically, but not always,
the invaded land belongs to the state. When an invasion is successful-which
is to say, not resisted by the police-the dwellers proceed to distribute plots
and, anticipating no formal government support, form a civic organization to
establish and enforce rules of conduct within the settlement.
Although it is possible under Peruvian law for an informal settlement to
attain official and formal status, including title, de Soto estimates that the
achievement of full formality would require 159 separate governmental
authorizations and take approximately twenty years. The unwillingness of the
police to evict, however, provides some degree of security, a security enhanced
as time passes and further investments in the settlement are made.
Lack of formal authorization, however, has not discouraged private
investment in informal settlements. Studying the informal settlements in
existence in 1982, de Soto and his group estimated that the average value of
a home in an informal settlement in Lima was $22,038, and the total value of
informal housing in Lima was equal to $8.32 billion, all the result of private
investment. In contrast, during the period of mass informal settlement, 1960
to 1984, the Peruvian government, though seemingly dedicated to social
reform, invested only $173.6 million in public housing, equal to 2.1% of
informal investment.6' In 1982, the housing stock of Lima, according to de
Soto, was 42.6% informal, 49.2% formal, and 8.2% slum areas.62
2. Informal Trade
63
De Soto identifies as informal trade the collection of sales by street
vendors, with and without permanent locations, as well as sales in stalls in
established markets. This trade is informal because it proceeds without
government permits, receipts records, or tax payments.
De Soto's group found that in 1986 there were 91,455 street vendors in
Lima. Eighty percent of the vendors operated in districts regarded as low-
income neighborhoods. Roughly 60% sold foodstuffs; 18% sold personal
accessories; 14% sold services; and 9% sold household and office supplies.
Fifty-four percent of the vendors were women.
64
Because these vendors operated outside formal law, rights of ownership
to locations were not certain, but were enforced to some extent within vendor
groups and associations. These associations also provided mutual policing and
self-defense from thieves as well as other invading vendors. Some degree of
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id.
63. This description is taken from id. at 59-92.
64. Id. at 60.
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property protection resulted. De Soto learned of the sale of the rights to a
three-square-meter location for a particular period of the day near a central
plaza for as much as $1000.65 De Soto's group estimated that street vending
provided employment for 314,000 people and generated sales of $322.2 million
per year.
66
Informal markets consist of groups of stalls established in central locations
and were preferred by vendors wanting to leave the streets. Although the
government established formal markets-that is, with permits-from 1965 to
1985, the creation of informal markets outstripped the formal by a twelve-to-
one ratio. De Soto's group identified 239 separate informal markets, more than
half of which were located in informal settlements. The group estimated that
these markets provided employment for 38,897 people.67
3. Informal Transport68
Informal transport consists of a collection of privately owned sedans,
station wagons, vans, and buses, whose chief occupation is to meet the
transportation needs of residents of informal settlements. These enterprises are
informal because they proceed without permits and, as a consequence, without
the benefits that come with formal status, including resort to contract law,
limited liability, credit, and insurance. According to de Soto, during the period
of study, 91% of all public transit vehicles in Lima were informal.69
Informal transport operations were successful if they could establish a
custom appropriate for their scale and could guarantee regular service. They
operated with much greater flexibility than typical public transit operations,
often traversing specific routes with particular points of pick-up and drop-off
convenient to individual riders. While it was impossible to gain rights to
particular routes, operators did form organizations that attempted to police
agreements, mediate disputes, and provide related services (including credit,
in some cases) to facilitate mutual benefit. De Soto's group estimated that the
replacement value of the capital stock of informal transport in Lima equalled
$620 million, with an additional $400 million invested in supportive
services.70
65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 60.
67. Id. at 61.
68. The description of informal transport is taken from id. at 93-127.
69. Id. at 93.
70. Id.
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C. Some Lessons from the Underground Experience
Although the activities of the second economy of the former Soviet Union
and of the informal economy of Peru appear to be very different, there are
substantial similarities among them in terms of their sources and effects. First,
much of the underground activity derives from the failure of the government
or other institutions of society to provide goods and services responsive to the
demands of its citizenry. Where government control is unable or unwilling to
provide goods, the market-necessarily in the Soviet Union, an underground
market-responds. It is well known that there were chronic shortages of food,
consumer goods, and services in the Soviet Union. As Yakovlev, the former
propaganda minister, put it, "For decades, cast iron, coal, steel, and petroleum
had priority over food, housing, hospitals, schools, and services."'" The
second economy arose to partially replenish shortages in such areas as
agriculture, housing, and even books and jam jar lids. According to Boris
Rumer, for instance, the second agricultural economy was able to "substantially
counteract the deepening food crisis in the country."'72 In such contexts, in
which the magnitude of the state's failure was sufficiently large, the state
began to embrace and even promote the second economy.
The Peruvian informal economy, similarly, arose to satisfy unfulfilled
demands. Constrained by governmental regulations that made acquiring urban
land and housing virtually impossible through formal, legal means, the
Peruvian informals created settlements through squatting and private
investment. As de Soto reports, informal housing investments vastly exceeded
government investments in housing over the same period. The experience with
informal transport and trade is similar. Private buses and vans filled routes not
serviced by public transportation. Burgeoning private markets and street
vendors vastly expanded the range of items-chiefly low-priced
items-available for purchase along public thoroughfares.
The employment of the black market in the Soviet Union as an incentive
for bureaucrats themselves may illustrate a related effect: the use of the
underground economy to achieve ends that are frustrated by prevailing
regulation. It is difficult in some cases to distinguish between bureaucratic
involvement in the black market as a technique for enhancing bureaucratic
production, and bureaucratic involvement that represents simply a corrupt
exploitation of power. Yet, there are certainly instances in which reliance on
the black market enhanced the ability of government officers to satisfy
planning needs, for example, where supplies were bartered (rather than
71. Yakovlev, supra note 55, at 74.
72. Rumer, supra note 19, at 560.
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allocated according to planning directives) in order to accelerate deliveries. In
addition, government officers' relative freedom to travel abroad where they
could purchase goods, and their relative insulation from prosecution for black
market participation may have served as a means to recruit relatively more able
individuals to the bureaucracy than would otherwise choose to serve.
Moreover, even if the channeling of special goods to government officers or
their obtaining them on the black market is regarded as corrupt, both represent
a further example of the market providing goods insufficiently provided by the
government. Bureaucrats, no less than private citizens, possess demands which,
if not satisfied by government production, will generate opportunities for a
black market or underground economic activity.
The underground economies have had similar effects in the Soviet and
Peruvian societies, in that both clearly increased the wealth of those societies.
This increase is illustrated by de Soto's estimates of housing settlements worth
billions of dollars and markets generating hundreds of millions of dollars in
annual sales. The Peruvian experience parallels the second Soviet agricultural
economy, which produced thirty to sixty percent of aggregate foodstuffs.
Besides increasing wealth, underground economies (like formal markets)
improve the allocation of societal resources. Examples include the conversion
of what de Soto calls government waste land into urban neighborhoods of
substantial value,73 and the achievement of extraordinary agricultural yields
from less than two percent of Soviet arable land.
The contributions of these underground economies to society, however, are
not merely financial. The Soviet black market facilitated the distribution and
sale of books, recordings, and videos. Soviet officials themselves extolled the
second agricultural economy as instilling an important work ethic in children
and encouraging initiative. This is not to say that the underground market
serves as a complete moral tutor of the citizenry. Like any formal market, it
can only be responsive to the demands of the citizenry. But the existence of
the underground economy reflects, by definition, a response to citizen demands
unfulfilled by government.
Finally, the underground economy has important implications for the issue
of income distribution. As the Peruvian examples show, informal economic
activity vastly increases the well-being of the poorest among the population.
The informal economy represents efforts to meet housing, transport, and trade
needs that would otherwise be unmet. The difference in Peru between
government investment in housing for the poor ($173.6 million) and private
investment ($8.32 billion) suggests the power of underground economic
73. I ignore the fact that the conversion was achieved through theft, though I discuss the moral defense
of government policies and citizens' responses to them infra, Part II.
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activity to promote the welfare of the least well-off.74 The Soviet examples
are largely similar. Many of the services in the second Soviet economy are
those typically provided by individuals with less skill and lower incomes, such
as hunting, fishing, and home and appliance repair. The various Soviet reports
also document relatively greater levels of underground activity (homebuilding,
for example) in rural areas and provinces, away from more industrialized
cities.75
Generally, underground economies provide comparatively greater
opportunities for women and other groups traditionally subject to
discrimination. Sampson reports that many entrepreneurs within the
underground Soviet economy were "Armenians, Georgians, or Jews who have
been denied avenues of social mobility in the normal hierarchies of science,
arts, the army, or the party.' 76 In both Peru and the former Soviet Union, the
underground economy provides relatively greater opportunities for women to
participate in the labor force than does the formal economy.77 Beyond the
Soviet and Peruvian examples, Lever reports an underground economy
dominated by women in Spain.78 And, in a more general review of informal
economies worldwide, Portes and Bbr6cz conclude that "members of
discriminated ethnic and racial groups tend to be overrepresented as workers
in informal enterprises .... The existence of socially ascribed negative
stereotypes of a particular group facilitates their willingness to accept
unprotected and poorly paid work in general, thus propelling them towards
informality.
' 79
II. THE MARKET VERSUS THE STATE AS A MECHANISM OF ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE EVALUATION OF THE
UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES
We have identified the principal contributions of underground economies
to the societies within which they operate as wealth creation, superior resource
allocation, and an increase in economic opportunities for the poor and other
74. Participants in the underground economy, of course, proceed without the benefit of safety
regulation and other governmental controls. Whether these governmental policies constitute true
"protections" of the poor is addressed infra, Part II.
75. Grossman, supra note 23, at 34 (rural Georgia); Feldbrugge, supra note 12, at 308-09 (rural
Georgia).
76. Steven Sampson, "May You Live Only by Your Salary!": The Unplanned Economy in Eastern
Europe, 15 Soc. JUST., Fall-Winter 1988, at 148.
77. Alejandro Portes & J6zsef Btr6cz, The Informal Sector under Capitalism and State Socialism: A
Preliminary Comparison, 15 SoC. JUST., Fall-Winter 1988, at 22; de Soto, supra note 56, at 60.
78. Alison Lever, Women's Employment in the Informal Sector: San Santiago, Spain, 15 Soc. JUST.,
Fall-Winter 1988, at 87.
79. Portes & B6r6cz, supra note 77, at 21-22.
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victims of discrimination. These contributions are features of all markets,
whether underground or formal, and reflect the differential capacities of
markets to politics, as mechanisms for directing economic activity. Traditional
comparisons of the market to political organization have conceded the
superiority of the market in terms of both wealth creation and the
maximization of individual liberty,80 but have criticized the market not only
for what are typically referred to as "market failures" but also for the inability
of the market to achieve "higher" societal goals purportedly only attainable
through political action.8' As we shall see, examples from the underground
economies suggest that the moral justification of the marketplace is
substantially broader.
Politics and the market can be regarded as alternative means of
aggregating the preferences or demands of the citizenry with respect to the
disposition of resources available to the society. The government of a society,
regardless of the form of political organization, derives from and, to some
extent, is responsive to the demands of its citizens regarding the allocation of
resources. The "government" and the actions it takes to control economic
activity represent only the result, the expression, of some aggregation of
citizens' preferences effected according to the rules and procedures of the
political organization of the society.
The market, similarly, is a mechanism for aggregating citizens' demands.
Necessarily reliant upon some prior definition of property rights, the market,
in contrast to the state, operates through the interactions of individual citizens
by means of trade or exchange. The aggregation of these interactions, too,
results in an allocation of societal resources.
The metaphor that Adam Smith chose to illustrate the operation of the
market and its difference from the state-the metaphor of the "invisible
hand"-is misdescriptive in this regard. The operation of an invisible hand
aptly captures Smith's important point that the seemingly uncoordinated actions
of thousands of separate individuals can generate a coherent and defensible
allocation of resources. But the contrast between an invisible hand of the
market and a visible hand of government is misleading. Perhaps the monarchy
of Smith's time or, say, a totalitarian regime such as Stalin's might
appropriately be described as operating in the manner of a visible hand. But
in the more complicated regimes of modem times-even totalitarian regimes
and surely, modem democracies-a metaphor suggesting a government
directed by a single hand is misplaced. The transformation of individual
80. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 7; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
81. See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 191 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 227 (1980).
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consumer preferences to an allocation of resources through the marketplace is
no more invisible than the transformation of individual citizens' political
preferences into government allocation decisions through the political
organization of the state.
Of course, there will be differences between the resultant allocation of
resources through the mechanism of the market and through the mechanism of
a state's political organization.82 Differences in outcome will derive from
differences in the operative mechanisms themselves. The respective
mechanisms of politics and the market are controlled by different rules and
procedures and will predictably generate different results.83
In addition, as has been traditionally emphasized to some extent, the
domain of politics and the market are different. There is no "market" for, say,
justice or civil virtue comparable to the effort to achieve these goals through
political action. This difference, however, is often overemphasized. No one can
deny that a broad range of political action-indeed, perhaps the broadest
range-operates solely to control economic activity and to allocate society's
resources.
The underground economy provides a critical and underappreciated picture
of the differences between the operation of politics and the market. Whatever
the form of political organization, the underground economy reflects the
conflict between the market and politics as mechanisms for satisfying the
desires of the citizenry with respect to the allocation of resources. Where
political controls prevent or constrain the satisfaction of citizen needs, a
demand for their satisfaction will arise, generating incentives for the creation
of a market. Because of government policies, this market necessarily must
operate underground.
A totalitarian government, such as that of the former Soviet Union, may
generate outcomes that deviate substantially from the desires of many citizens.
Similarly, a bureaucracy dominated by a plutocracy, as in Peru, may well
generate outcomes that are largely insensitive to the desires and interests of
many, including the poor. In societies of this nature, it is not surprising that
large underground economies arise. As the earlier examples suggested, these
underground economies generate a supply of products and services that have
been provided in insufficient quantity or quality by the governments
themselves. Indeed, the greater the deviation between the desires and demands
of the citizenry and the products and services either produced by the
government (as in the Soviet Union) or authorized by the government (as in
82. For a different discussion of this point, see JAMEs BUCHANAN, LIBERTy, MARKEr AND STATE
(1985).
83. This is the principal subject of the public choice literature.
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Peru), the larger one would expect the magnitude of underground economic
activity to be.
One might think that the existing underground economy in any society
could never represent exhaustive evidence of the conflict between aggregation
by means of political organization and aggregation by the market, because a
government's prohibition imposes costs that will suppress underground
economic activity to some extent. For example, if state enforcement were
sufficiently severe, underground economic activity may be negligible. The level
of government enforcement, however, will itself derive from some aggregation
of citizens' preferences expressed through the political process. Thus, where
government prohibitions of underground activity are severe, citizens'
preferences for such prohibitions must be of substantial magnitude. Conversely,
the second agricultural economy in the Soviet Union suggests that the size of
the underground economy correlates directly with the demands of the citizenry.
When demand is great, the state may be forced to embrace the underground
economy rather than continue to prohibit it.
As a consequence, except for those imaginary societies whose political
systems are perfectly responsive to citizens' desires, we can expect to observe
underground economies universally. These underground economies will be of
different dimensions, determined by the success or failure of the political
organization of the state to respond to the preferences or demands of individual
citizens. As the political organization of a state is more effectively responsive
to the preferences of its citizens, the alternative mechanism for the expression
of citizens' demands-the market, though an underground economy-will be
relatively small. In contrast, where the deviation of politics from the demands
of citizens is great, the alternative-the underground economy-will assume
substantial proportions.
It is important here to distinguish between the preferences and demands
of the "citizenry" viewed in some aggregate form, and the preferences and
demands of individual citizens or of some group of citizens. In an ideal world,
one might want a government to be responsive to each and every citizen as
well as to all groups of citizens, however small. Such an ideal is unrealistic,
however, not only in practical terms, but because the demands of different
citizens expressed in political terms often conflict. The conflicting demands of
citizens are less likely to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties through
politics than through a market if only because there is no political "currency"
equivalent to money in its capacity to register and then mediate differential
intensities of citizens' desires. The demands of those citizens outmuscled in the
political arena will provide the source for an underground economy.
For these reasons, it should not be surprising to discover the existence of
underground economies even in societies with political organizations that differ
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substantially from the totalitarian or plutocratic states reviewed above. Indeed,
the substantial literature on the political organization of democratic states can
explain the existence of underground economies even in what seem to be the
most open and least regulated societies. As is well known, the market and a
democracy sharply differ in terms of the respective mechanisms for the
aggregation of citizens' preferences. The market operates by registering
citizens' preferences as expressed in terms of willingness to pay. A currency,
money, allows different intensities of preferences to be expressed in perfect
detail. A democracy, in contrast, registers preferences of the citizenry through
the ballot. In a democracy, each citizen's vote is accorded equal weight. In all
democracies, however, only a limited number of citizens participate by voting.
These differences suggest a well-known set of problems in registering
citizens' preferences associated with markets and democracies, respectively.
Markets may fail to reflect the true preferences of the citizenry for reasons of
monopoly, externalities, the existence of public goods, and income
maldistribution. Democracies, on the other hand, may suffer problems of
aggregation in the definition of social welfare where votes are treated equally,
rather than weighted according to intensity of preference, leading to cycling
among voter preferences and the absence of stable equilibria.84 Democracies
are vulnerable to the control of special interests and voting blocs, because of
the resulting advantages of logrolling and because of limited participation in
the ballotY In addition, because, according to the pure theory of democracy,
the jurisdictional limits of different democratic political entities-cities,
counties, districts, states-are essentially arbitrary, the preferences of certain
groups of citizens may predominate differentially. Markets, in contrast, though
requiring some minimum scale of operations to be sustainable, can still be
responsive to preferences of very small numbers of citizens, and surely to
those with insufficient strength to command political attention.
To view the market and politics as no more than alternative mechanisms
for the aggregation of citizens' desires, however, puts into question the
conventional moral condemnation of the underground economies. There has
been a strong tradition in Western political thought to enshrine political action
as encompassing some inherently superior moral virtue in comparison to
activity in the marketplace. It follows from this tradition that any contravention
84. See KENNErH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). To simplify
Arrow's argument, if, among three policy alternatives, Voter I prefers policy A to B to C; Voter 2, B to
C to A; and Voter 3, C to A to B; in the absence of the ability to register the relative intensity of these
preferences (ie., where, unlike in a market, each "vote" is weighted equally), there will be no stable
equilibrium over successive rounds of voting. For a more general discussion of the problems in the
aggregation of preferences in a democratic state, see generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE IU
(1989).
85. See generally Mueller, supra note 84.
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of formally approved rules or regulations constitutes a violation of this moral
value. 6 The statist approach to the problem, however, must be reexamined.
The evaluation of politics versus the market in moral terms has tended to
be dominated by a view that emphasizes nonmaterial or noneconomic goals
and values-such as justice or community-differentially attainable through
politics. This paper is not the occasion to debate the point at length, but even
conceding these examples, the presumption of the moral superiority of politics
cannot be equally extended to the control of economic activity. In addition, the
moral superiority of political action has been defended, especially in Western
democracies, on the grounds of the essential equality of citizens in the voting
booth, in contrast to the marketplace.87 The desire for greater equality of
income or wealth stems from the view that, on moral grounds, citizens should
be equal, rather than differentiated according to success in the market.
The moral defense of the market and, by extension, of underground
economies, has been far less well developed. To canvass the moral landscape
briefly, however, markets promote many important societal values. There is
wide agreement that, given appropriate controls on monopoly and externalities
and appropriate investment in public goods, the market is superior to political
control as a means of societal wealth creation. In addition, putting aside (for
now) questions of income distribution, it is widely accepted that the market is
superior to political control as a mechanism for societal resource allocation. In
both respects, because of problems of vote aggregation and the influence of
special interests, regulation by political entities diverts the economy, reducing
wealth and misallocating societal resources.88 This, of course, is the vivid
lesson of the former Soviet and Eastern European economies, though I would
suspect that most would subscribe to the proposition more generally. In
addition, the moral justification of the market in terms of its maximization of
individual liberty is well known.89
The operation of the marketplace, however, promotes many other moral
values that are often neglected in traditional discussions. For example, with
respect to income distribution, a preference for income equality may surely be
defended, but such a defense must address the moral basis justifying the
distribution of rewards by the marketplace. Many individuals, including some
who staunchly defend the market on grounds of personal liberty, find it
difficult to defend on moral grounds the way in which the market rewards its
86. As an example of this approach, see the judgments of Professor Feige, supra text accompanying
notes 3-5.
87. See Dworkin, supra note 81.
88. Again, I except the control of monopolies and externalities, and the provision of public goods.
89. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); Richard
A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of the Underground Economy, 103 YALE LJ. 2157 (1994).
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participants. Hayek, for example, viewed the distribution of income and wealth
from market activities as largely fortuitous.90 Others go further and associate
market success with undesirable personal characteristics, such as greed9' or,
following Adam Smith, self-interest. Few have suggested that market rewards
bear any relation to a distribution that can be regarded as just.
There is a powerful consequentialist moral justification, however, for the
distribution of market incomes. The marketplace distributes rewards according
to the level of benefits provided to other individuals-consumers. 92 A citizen
is rewarded through the market exactly to the extent that that citizen has
created a product, added value to it, or provided a service of benefit to
someone else. Hayek viewed the shifting of profit opportunities in response to
changes in supply and demand as fortuitous, and it is from the standpoint of
the participant who, in a competitive market, cannot influence price. From the
standpoint of consumer beneficiaries, however, differential rewards in response
to changes in supply and demand are well deserved, since the market price
reflects the benefit conferred upon consumers. Indeed, better than any other
imaginable measure of desert, the market provides rewards according to
genuine evaluations of the level of benefit provided, as the beneficiary
personally indicates value and consents to receive it by voluntary payment for
the product or service.
This is necessarily a consequentialist definition of a moral or just
distribution of rewards. Most moral criticisms of the market have derived from
the Kantian focus on the intention of the participant, and have largely accepted
Adam Smith's characterization of markets motivated by self-interest. A full
discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Essay. Viewed
differently, however, as a system for the distribution of rewards, the level of
self-interest of a market participant is of no general importance because, under
a system of laws, greed does not correlate with productivity.93 The
beneficiary of market activities-the consumer-cannot distinguish a monster
of greed in a competitive market from an altruist willing to sell a product at
bare cost. As a system, the market distributes rewards as might God in the
afterlife: according to the level of benefits conferred on others.
90. See 2 FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 126-28 (1976).
91. Stuart Henry, Can the Hidden Economy Be Revolutionary? Toward a Dialectical Analysis of the
Relations Between Formal and Informal Economies, Soc. JUST., Fall-Winter 1988, at 29.
92. See JOHN B. CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914). For a less developed version of this
approach, and different because of its advocacy of market simulation through judicial decisionmaking,
rather than genuine market activity itself, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115
(1981).
93. This point is important for the evaluation of the moral justification of underground economic
activity. See infra pp. 2281-82, 2284-85.
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The recognition of the market and politics as alternative mechanisms for
the aggregation and expression of citizens' desires also suggests another moral
defense of the market in contrast to politics, here on noninstrumental grounds.
For example, the Kantian values of autonomy and respect for the person are
often invoked in defense of the democratic principle of the equally weighted
ballot,94 especially in contrast with the market, in which individuals enter
with differential abilities to pay.95 On the other hand, the outcomes of
political action, except in rare cases of unanimity, necessarily entail the
prevalence of desires of one set of citizens over another. The market, in
contrast, and underground economic exchanges in particular, involve
consensual transactions between participants, thus reflecting an aggregation of
citizen preferences that is purely noncoercive.96
Finally, the underground economies provide substantial evidence of the
success of the market in contrast to politics, in terms of promoting what might
be called the Rawlsian value of protecting those least advantaged in society.
9 7
The examples of the Soviet Union and Peru show that underground economies
provide a mechanism for those without political influence to help themselves
and, at the same time, to contribute to society by providing goods and services
of benefit to others. Underground economies provide opportunities for those
with low incomes and low skill levels, as well as those subjected to
discrimination, to participate in the economy-participation otherwise denied
them through the political process. Discrimination is often successfully
implemented politically because a citizen can express a discriminatory
preference without cost and because discrimination often provides a vivid
ground for vote aggregation. It is substantially more difficult for a consumer
to discriminate against producers of goods in the market, since their identities
are generally unknown. It is not surprising, therefore, that the examples of the
informal economy in Peru illustrate that the market created far greater wealth
for the poor than did the social welfare governments that were politically
dedicated to help them.
These various values promoted by the market:
1) wealth creation;
2) the superior allocation of resources;
3) the maximization of individual liberty;
4) the distribution of rewards according to benefits conferred;
94. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 84-101 (1989). These values also
support democratic protections of individual rights, though the protection of individual rights is in no way
inconsistent with market activity.
95. See Dworkin, supra note 81; Kronman, supra, note 81.
96. The point is suggested in POSNER, supra note 92. But cf. Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980).
97. JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14-15 (1971).
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5) respect for personal autonomy; and
6) the creation of opportunities for the poor;
are surely considerable. Of course, the universal prevalence of an institution
such as the market might suggest that it promotes widely held societal values.
Indeed, it is curious that there has not been more systematic appreciation of the
market's role.
These moral foundations of the legitimate market, however, are different
from the moral foundations of the underground economy. The legitimate
market is not burdened with prohibitions derived from political action. Yet,
except for asserting the superiority of the state, there are no a priori grounds
for allowing the political prohibition itself to trump. Nevertheless, in the first
instance, the political prohibition is surely evidence that some set of citizens
believes that the underground activity diminishes societal welfare.
Some commentators, of course, defend underground economic activity on
the basis of just one of the values listed above: the maximization of personal
liberty.9" Such a position is surely defensible. Yet a broader defense can be
raised. Among the wide range of activities lumped together under the
"underground" category, those that promote all of the values of the market
listed above-beyond merely the maximization of personal liberty-stand on
the strongest moral foundation.
For purposes of such moral evaluation, it is helpful to distinguish between
two sets of underground economic activities: first, those that represent merely
pecuniary transfers from the government to the citizen; and, second, those that
are related to increased productivity and that facilitate market exchange. This
distinction will be more fully illustrated in the next Part but, as an example,
an underground activity such as counterfeiting currency is very difficult to
defend on grounds of the moral values promoted by the market. Counterfeiting
has a redistributive effect only. It does not enhance national wealth; ignoring
effects on the money supply, it has no positive effect on the allocation of
resources; the gains to the participants do not derive from benefits conferred
on others; and it does not systematically create opportunities for the poor.
Some may defend the activity on grounds of minimizing interference with
personal liberty, but the defense is not compelling.
In contrast, the various underground economic activities described above
within the former Soviet Union and in Peru-for example, the second Soviet
agricultural economy and informal activities in Peru-appear defensible largely
because their effects are so different: they increase societal wealth; improve
resource allocation; distribute rewards according to benefits conferred; and
provide opportunities for the poor; in addition to enabling greater personal
98. See Epstein, supra note 89.
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freedom and respecting personal autonomy. Given these virtues, the activities
are easily defended on moral grounds, regardless of their formal legal
prohibition. Indeed, as we have seen, these virtues in many instances led even
the respective states subsequently to embrace them.
The distinction I have drawn resembles the distinction in economics
between productive and redistributive activities, although it is broader. No
economic activity has effects that are solely redistributive: even thieves later
spend the money they steal. In contrast, the distinction that I propose is
between underground economic activities that stimulate market action-such
as the second Soviet agricultural economy or informal housing or trade in
Peru-and activities that merely make one set of individuals more wealthy at
the expense of the state, which is to say, at the expense of all other citizens not
participating in the underground activity.
Ill. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY: THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF UNDERGROUND ACTIvTEs IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE
It is straightforward to defend the underground economy in a totalitarian
state such as the former Soviet Union, and even in a hyper-regulated state, as
de Soto describes Peru. This Part addresses, though briefly, a more difficult
question: Are there moral justifications for some set of underground economic
activities within a democracy such as the United States?
Among the advanced nations, the United States possesses the most
extensive and least regulated market economy. Recent studies indicate,
however, that there is a substantial underground economy in the United
States.99 As indicated earlier, a 1992 Department of Labor publication
distinguishes among aspects of the underground economy in this country
according to the following categories: illegal, unreported, unrecorded, and
informal. "' The illegal sector comprises traffic in prohibited goods and
services, such as prostitution, drugs, firearms, counterfeit currency, and loan
sharking. The unreported sector consists principally of tax evasion, both of
income taxes and of employment taxes and benefits.'0 ' The unrecorded sector
encompasses those activities that never reach the eye of statistical agencies in
any way, distinguishing, for example, those who underpay taxes (unreported)
from those who never file at all (unrecorded). Examples of unrecorded
99. Richard D. Porter & Amanda S. Bayer, Monetary Perspective on Underground Economic Activity
in the United States, in THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES, supra note 5, at 129, 129; DEP'T O1 LABOR,
supra note 1, at 9-26.
100. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note I, at 4.
101. Some of the activities that the publication categorizes as illegal, such as violations of liquor
controls and smuggling, may be better understood as examples of tax evasion. Appropriate categorization,
however, is not important to the study here.
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economic activities are farm and construction work, work "off-the-books," and
various personal services. Finally, the informal sector-not sharply
distinguished from the unrecorded-consists of work violative of some
prohibition, though not illegal in itself: in particular, domestic or factory work
by illegal immigrants, and the like. These categorizations are not watertight,
but that is unimportant for this study. The Department of Labor report presents
estimates of the size of the aggregate underground economy from $42 billion
to $1.096 trillion.'02 Is there a moral justification for any of these
underground economic activities?
A. The Illegal Economy
The moral defensibility of an illegal economy in a democratic state is
different from the moral defensibility of the activities-for example,
prostitution and drugs-that constitute that economy. Many people-myself
included-condemn drug use and prostitution in the sense of making a
personal moral judgment never to engage in such activities. It is a different
matter to conclude that the state should employ its force to prohibit all citizens
from engaging in such activities.
The existence of an underground economy in these activities, of course,
is definitive evidence that not all citizens share this moral judgment. Besides
participants themselves, some libertarians support the legalization of these
activities on grounds of maximizing liberty and respecting the personal
autonomy of equal citizens. Though much more careful attention should be
given to the topic, it is possible that the broader moral values of the market
would also support legalization. Whatever one's moral feelings, prostitution
and the drug trade involve transactions that are more or less voluntary,0 3
between citizens who believe the transaction will benefit their lives. Tangible
external effects-except those, like violence, that derive from the prohibition
itself-are modest. Rewards are distributed according to benefits conferred.
And it is possible that these activities create opportunities otherwise
unavailable to the poor."°
This, of course, is purely speculation. Perhaps because of the moral
opprobrium attached to these activities, there is little careful study of the extent
to which the drug or prostitution industry resembles more familiar examples
of capitalism. The positive moral foundation of market activity depicts a trade
or business in which there are continuous incentives and opportunities for
102. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 1, at 20.
103. The less voluntary these transactions are, the more readily one can condemn them.
104. See William Finnegan, Out There (pts. 1 & 2), NEv YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990, at 51-86, Sept. 17,
1990, at 60-90.
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participants to improve their skills and productivity, thus increasing their
incomes and job mobility. Such achievements are the byproduct of providing
benefits to customers and of increasing societal wealth. It is not evident that
the drug trade and prostitution are characterized by these values. Indeed,
despite substantial citizen demand and the large monetary stakes involved, it
is not apparent that the drug trade increases national wealth in any respect.
Other elements of the illegal economy such as counterfeiting or smuggling
possess no positive moral values. These activities appear solely redistributive
in character, which is to say that they neither increase societal wealth nor
enhance the allocation of resources. There is no current reason to believe that
these activities provide systematic opportunities for the disadvantaged. Thus,
they are straightforwardly condemned.
B. The Unrecorded and Unreported Economies
The unrecorded and unreported economies are different from the illegal
economy in that they do not constitute a set of activities qualitatively distinct
from legal markets; instead, they represent totally lawful economic activities
whose participants evade applicable taxes. Tax evasion might seem to be the
easiest of rule contraventions to condemn as redistributive, rather than
productive, but a more careful analysis is necessary.
Imagine two separate contexts of tax evasion. In the first, a producer
evades taxes by misentering sales of $100,000 as equal to $10,000. In the
second, by evading taxes-say, employment taxes-the producer manages to
avert insolvency to stay in business or to sell more of the product at a lower
price than would be sold otherwise. The first context is an example of a purely
redistributive gain; the second, a productive gain. In the first context, the
producer becomes richer by exactly the amount of the diminution in tax yield.
The net wealth of the society is unchanged. In contrast, in the second context,
the tax evasion promotes all of the values previously identified with market
activity. The additional sales of the product enhance societal wealth, confer
benefits to consumers and provide products for sale at prices lower than
otherwise possible, potentially enhancing the position of the least advantaged.
In addition, the evasion of the employment tax will increase employment,
again potentially aiding either those who are less advantaged to begin with or
those who would become less advantaged by losing their employment.
A more precise depiction of the distinction between these contexts can be
made. It is well established (and obvious) that the imposition of a tax on a
product will increase its price and reduce consumer demand. When price
increases, consumers must satisfy their needs by purchasing other, less
satisfactory products or, lacking such alternatives, leave those needs unmet. In
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addition, employment in the industry, as well as utilization of other factors of
production, will decline. In economics, these effects are described as the
deadweight loss of taxation and are represented on a supply and demand graph
by a triangle, which incorporates the loss of both consumer and producer
surplus.
The distinction between the two contexts of tax evasion above relates to
this deadweight loss from taxation. In the second context, the continued
production of the good and its sale at a price lower than that charged by
producers who pay the tax can be regarded as partially restoring the
deadweight loss from the tax.105
The evasion of the tax restores the consumer and producer surplus
otherwise sacrificed as a casualty of the tax. To the extent of the
restoration-and putting aside for now the fiscal effects of evasion-societal
welfare is enhanced. More generally, the moral values of the market-wealth
creation, superior allocation of resources, distribution of benefits to consumers
and of rewards in proportion to these benefits, creation of opportunities for the
least advantaged, and the maximization of liberty and respect for personal
autonomy-are equally enhanced.
In contrast, in the first context, in which the producer misreported sales of
$100,000 as equal to $10,000, there is no effect on the deadweight loss of
taxation. There is only a fiscal effect, presumably negative given the lawful
imposition of the tax. There is no restoration of consumer or producer surplus,
nor any increase in sales or employment. As a consequence, there is no
positive moral basis for the tax evasion.
The deadweight loss analogy can be extended more generally. Those
activities of underground economies-whatever the society-that have
appeared morally justifiable are similar because they represent efforts to restore
deadweight losses created by governmental action. The development of a
second agricultural economy in the former Soviet Union represents the effort
to reduce the deadweight loss manifested in the chronic shortages created by
the Soviet system of state and collective farms. The creation of informal
housing settlements in Peru represents the reduction of the deadweight loss
created by government land allocation policies and building regulations.
In contrast, elements of underground economies that have no positive
effect on the deadweight loss from political policies cannot be morally
defended. Counterfeiting, smuggling, and the fraudulent misreporting of sales
information have no effect on consumer or producer surplus as defined in
economics, because they have no effect on productive output or, at best, a
negative effect since real resources are expended to achieve a solely
105. If all producers evaded the tax, the deadweight loss would be completely restored.
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redistributive gain.10 6 The deadweight loss analogy is also helpful in
considering the otherwise ambiguous cases of prostitution and the drug trade.
The (idealized) defense of prostitution is that it provides through market
processes for satisfaction of legitimate human sexual needs without effect, or
with positive effect, on the other productive activities of participants. 7 The
debilitating character of addictive drugs is different in this respect. The market
for drugs may inflict negative external effects on other productive enterprises,
reducing net consumer and producer surplus.
The deadweight loss analogy in itself does not provide a complete answer
to the ultimate moral judgment, but it does suggest both positive and normative
implications. First, all taxes (and equivalent governmental actions) distort
economic activity, but the distortions occur in different ways and the resulting
deadweight losses can differ substantially. Speaking strictly of taxes, there will
be different levels of deadweight loss according to different products and
services taxed and according to how the taxes are imposed.' In the first
instance, we might observe that the relative magnitude of underground
economies is a measure of the relative degree of deadweight loss from
taxation. The evasion of taxes as well as other governmental rules and
regulations will be a function, of course, of the penalties for evasion and the
likelihood of apprehension. Holding expected penalties constant, however, the
productive benefits from evasion are represented by the deadweight loss of
taxation. Those activities generating greater levels of productive evasion are
likely to be those in which deadweight losses are large. It follows that
observations of the underground economy can identify those areas in which the
society has most to gain from tax reduction. The larger the extent of
productive evasion, the greater the justification for reducing the tax. This, of
course, is only a different way of describing the example of the Soviet
government ultimately embracing and promoting the second agricultural
economy. A more recent example of the same phenomenon is the effort to
reduce and simplify the tax reporting requirements for maids and housekeepers
in the United States, a reform made compelling by the discovery of widespread
employment tax evasion among political leaders and candidates.
The ultimate normative judgment of tax evasion is more complicated.
There are no a priori grounds for presuming that all taxes enhance societal
welfare. Those who condemn underground economies seem to presuppose that
106. For a similar analysis, see Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83
J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
107. Again, this is an idealization and ignores the exploitative features of much of the industry.
108. For a discussion of optimal taxation, see ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITT_
LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 366-456 (1980). For a more practical approach, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 399-411 (1986).
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all government money is spent on true public goods. If this were true, then
underground economic activity would diminish social welfare, at least when
defined in terms of wealth maximization. That presupposition, however, is
highly suspect; no serious student of politics can support it. A moral and
economic judgment necessarily requires a comparison of the benefits conferred
by the governmental action against the loss from the economic distortion
introduced.
C. The Informal Economy
In an advanced capitalist country such as the United States, the informal
economy largely consists of the evasion of such governmental regulations as
immigration restrictions or safety and building codes. Although there are no
exhaustive studies of the subject, much of this evasion seems designed to
enable the poor to produce goods or provide services at lower cost, or to buy
products and services at lower prices than possible otherwise. The Peruvian
examples, while more extreme, appear cut from the same cloth.
As with the informal economy of Peru, these examples seem almost
entirely market facilitating. Thus, they enhance societal wealth, improve the
allocation of societal resources, distribute rewards according to benefits
conferred and, most importantly, create new opportunities for the least
advantaged. 0 9 The moral criticism of these activities must build from a
moral defense of some abstractly optimal level of immigration, quality of
housing, building, or the like. Much of the political regulation generating these
informal activities is defended on the paternalistic grounds that the polity
expressing itself through the political process possesses greater information or
better judgment than the poor and, therefore that the poor should be prevented
from subjecting themselves to the lower standards implied by evasion. It
should be remembered, however, that similar expressions of paternalism stood
beneath the regulations generating informal economic activities in the former
Soviet Union and Peru.
IV. CONCLUSION
In any society, the constitution of the underground economy reflects the
difference between the aggregation of citizen preferences by the political
system and the exercise of those preferences in the market. At base, therefore,
the moral status of the underground economy stands on the same moral
considerations that arise from the differences between the marketplace and
109. This conclusion ignores claims that some amount of undocumented labor or other informal
activity suffers exploitation because of its informal character.
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politics as methods of economic organization. The aggregate moral judgment
is necessarily ambiguous, though more confident moral conclusions may be
reached from the study of individual examples.
No one denies that some public goods exist, which justify some taxation,
or that some externalities exist, which justify some level of government
regulation. But no one can convincingly argue that all government
expenditures create public goods or that all regulations control externalities.
Until that is true, the moral values of the marketplace: wealth creation, superior
allocation of resources, maximization of individual liberty, the distribution of
benefits to consumers and of rewards according to benefits conferred, respect
for personal autonomy, and the creation of opportunities for the poor, provide
a moral foundation for those underground economic activities that achieve
them.
